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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
 
This present study aims to analyze the relations interconnecting corporate governance 
and internal audit functions in Greek public firms. It is generally accepted, that the 
correlation between internal auditing and corporate governance affects all kinds of 
economic activities. The need for internal auditing and corporate governance has 
already become a significant matter of public interest. 
 
The dissertation is about Greek public companies of the Athens stock exchange, 
studying the degree of implementation of internal auditing structures from the 
companies and suggesting good practices about corporate governance. It also 
investigates to which extent the Greek companies espouse the modern principles of 
corporate governance. Moreover, the degree of correlation between financial 
performance and internal auditing structures is also examined. 
 
The dissertation results demonstrate that there are deficiencies in the degree of 
maturity in internal auditing structures and corporate governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of giant companies has sparked investor relations, as investors seem to be 
- more than ever before - wary of showing lower confidence in companies, 
entrepreneurship and financial markets than before the financial crisis emerged. 
Inspired by the successive collapse of large and small companies in the last few 
decades, with the simultaneous disclosure of scandals that led to this end, investors 
highlighted the importance of corporate governance. 
 
This paper is aimed to critically analyze and discuss to what extent the internal audit 
characteristic of a listed firm or a listed business enterprise may additionally play a role 
in combating effective corporate governance. Corporate governance is described by 
way of Cadbury Committee (1992) as “the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled”, consisting internal and external mechanisms. 
 
The need to strengthen the application of corporate governance rules to companies is 
now imperative in order to enhance transparency in their operation, to re-create a 
sense of security and trust in the investing public and thus to lay the foundations for 
the sustainable development of companies . In all countries, laws have been in place 
for several decades defining the basic principles of corporate governance. 
 
Through agency theory and the principal-agent problem, the significance of corporate 
governance for an organization is even more emphasized. Corporate governance refers 
to the context that defines the relationship between the three pillars of the modern 
enterprise, namely the shareholders of the management and the BoD. The regulation 
of the obligations and rights of these three sides is now the subject of systematic 
consideration in all developed economies (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
Additionally, it refers to a set of principles on the basis of which the responsible 
organization, operation, management and control of an enterprise with the long-term 
aim of maximizing value and preserving the legitimate interests of those associated 
with it (Logan et al. 2005). The necessity to emphasize on improving corporate 
governance has been expanded in many evolved and developing economies over the 
past decades, especially in the mild of economic crumble and financial crises (Brown 
and Caylor, 2006).A very important part of corporate governance is that it will ensure 
that the financiers of the various companies get their return on the investments they 
have made (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Generally speaking, corporate governance can specify the conformation of rights and 
responsibilities between the distinctive individuals in a company including the Board of 
Directors, senior executives, shareholders and other involved internal and external 
individuals of the organization (stakeholders) (Xanthakis et al., 2003). 
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1.2 Research Questions 
 
In this study we want to contribute how the internal audit enables the listed companies of 
ATHEX to achieve their strategic goals. In summary,  
 
•How can internal audit help the company to achieve its goals?  
• Could internal control be used as a tool to make an organization more effective?  
• Is internal audit a mechanism for an organization to achieve its goals?  
 
These questions are going to constitute a research hypothesis for our work. The main 
hypothesis although is still the following: “Internal Audit plays a role in achieving corporate 
goals”. 
 
 
1.2.1 Research methodology 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate how auditing contributes to the fulfillment of 
corporate ambitions. To make this conceivable we must comprehend the impact of the audit. 
This research intents to further analyze the position of the internal audit functions regarding 
corporate governance of the indexed companies of Athens stock exchange. The paper focuses 
on comparing the association between each element of corporate governance and internal 
audit. This will be achieved through the evaluation of a literature review in order to expand 
hypotheses that underscore the degree to which the quality of the internal audit function 
influences the quality of corporate governance. 
By using a qualitative approach of open ended questions we will collect our data. The 
empirical approach is primarily based on observation, documentation and interviews. The 
qualitative procedure with theoretical investigation will guide us, answering our questions 
and reaching our purpose. The questionnaire survey is one of the most common techniques 
utilized for data collection and generating knowledge by responding precisely to the 
objectives and questions that are examined.  
 
1.2.2 Data collection 
 
At first, we study a full cross-section of all listed Greek firms, both large and small. 
Furthermore, we use a broad corporate governance index that is based on responses to 
objective questions. To rate the compliance with the overlapping provisions, the total sample 
of the listed in Athens Stock Exchange companies was used; however, those with no sufficient 
data were excluded. The final sample of 209 listed companies was categorized, based on their 
capitalization, to the FTSE Large Cap, the FTSE Mid Cap, the FTSE Small Cap and the Rest 
category, while the evaluation data were provided through a prior study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Literature development 
 
 
With the outbreak of monetary collapse and the economic crisis, the necessity for improving 
corporate governance become more and more intense and has been increased in many 
developing economies (Brown & Caylor, 2006). The establishment of corporate governance 
took advantage for defended a minority of shareholders from the expropriation by managers 
or controlling shareholders. The elements of corporate governance include the audit 
committee, external auditor, internal audit, and the Board of Directors. 
Although, the existence of agency problems is due to asymmetric information behavior of the 
agent that cannot be detected, agency problems exist between principal and agent because 
of the differences of goal to achieve (Jensen and Meckling ,1976).  
For this reason, audit committee and audit quality can minimize agency cost.  For the audit 
committee to be fully independent and an effective committee, the majority of the members 
must be independent directors or non-executive directors (SEC Code, 2011). Studies reported 
that a large audit committee inclines to improve the audit committee’s status and power 
within an organization (Kalbers& Fogarty, 1993). 
 
2.2 Significance of the Study 
 
For several years now, a large body of research experts has been emphasizing the need to 
strengthen Corporate Governance (Gamal, 2015). On the contrary, only limited research on 
the relationship between internal audit and corporate governance has been conducted. In 
view of the limited internal audit research in Greece, this study attempts to provide insights 
into the crucial factors that lead to effective corporate governance. The paper adds to the 
existing literature on corporate governance by documenting the association between 
corporate governance and internal auditors’ role. 
 
Internal audit is an independent management tool of a business that offers its services by 
examining and evaluating the latter's activities. Its objective is to contribute to the efficient 
performance of the duties of members of the respective business, offering them analysis, 
assessments, proposals, consultancy services and information related to the controlled 
objects (Filos,2004). 
 
Internal audit is encouraged to set up an Audit Committee consisting of non-executive 
members of the Board whose powers and duties are clearly described against their 
appointment by the General Meeting of Shareholders. Finally, for the more efficient 
management of the company the establishment of an audit committee is recommended 
among other things,. 
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The concept of internal control marks a new entrepreneurial concept that creates a strategic 
advantage in the modern and competitive environment (Papastathis, 2003). In conclusion, the 
necessity of internal control gives simplicity by a classic example, the French Pierre A. 
Dussaulx, in 1970, who states among other things: "... every living organism, every machine, is 
gifted either by their nature or by their manufacturer, with regulatory arrangements, 
designed to discipline their movements and to maintain coherence in its structures". 
 
 
2.3 The consulting role of Internal Audit 
 
Internal control plays an important role in implementing the principles of corporate 
governance. These principles are safeguarded by internal control as they form an integral part 
of the internal control system. Transparency, consistency and accountability are elements 
that govern the objectives of internal control, which evaluates and records internal 
procedures in practice, identifies weaknesses and deviations of the system and provides 
advice and proposes adjustments (Papastathis, 2003). 
 
Internal control assures management that everything works the way it is intended and 
extends beyond accounting and financial functions covering the full breadth of the company 
as it covers all the organization's activities. Additionally, the provision of a high level of service 
to management through scientific analyzes to evaluate its system and reduce operational 
risks (Karagiorgos et al., 2008). 
 
The purpose of internal control is to provide, as much as possible, specialized and high-level 
services to management. Through the internal control system's assessment, internal control 
assists all the members of the company in the effort of internal control to provide specialized 
and high-level (Papastathis, 2003).  
 
Finally, internal control aims not only in compliance with rules and regulations, but also in the 
creation of principles, standards and values for the individuals of the company, resulting in 
security for both the owners of the economic unit and the wider business environment 
(Dittenhofer, 2001). 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
3.1 Definition of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance, which is reflected over its origins, is the modern company 
having certainly received increased attention and control over the past two decades 
(Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). With the passing of time, we can clearly notice the 
importance of corporate governance which has not only been mentioned in academic 
literature, but in public policy debates as well. Corporate governance issues in general 
have received greater attention as a result of growing recognition; corporate 
governance affects both its financial performance and its ability to access long-term 
and low capital investment (Mordelet, 2009). Moreover, it is widely known in all 
countries and businesses. A higher quality of corporate governance allows businesses 
to gain access to capital markets easily, which is an important asset for business, since 
it enables them to boost their capital. Corporate governance is defined as the entire 
body of operations and controls of the organization (Fama and Jensen, 1983) or a 
comprehensive structured authority system (Dey committee, 1994), according to 
which an enterprise operates, is organized, managed and controlled Corporate 
governance in the academic field was virtually absent before the 1970s, but has since 
come to the forefront and undoubtedly become one of the main theories (Daily et al., 
2003). 
 
In general, corporate governance refers to procedures by which organizations are 
instructed, controlled and managed. 
It includes the authority, responsibility, management, leadership, direction and control 
exercised in the organization. 
 
Definitions of corporate governance vary greatly. They tend to be divided into two 
categories: 
The first set of definitions deals with a number of patterns of behavior: that is the 
actual behavior of firms in terms of measures, such as performance, returns, growth, 
financial structure and treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The second group deals with the regulatory framework: that is the rules deriving from 
the operations that operate with rules derived from sources such as the legal system, 
the judicial system, the financial markets, and the factor (labor) markets. 
 
For studies of individual countries or businesses in one country, the first type of 
definition is the most reasonable option. It takes under consideration issues such as 
the management boards, the role of executive compensation for determining fixed 
performance, the relationship between labor market policies and stable performance, 
and the role of multiple shareholders. In the case of comparative studies the second 
type of definition is chosen, since it is considered as the most reasonable of the two. 
The definition also investigates the differences in the regulatory framework and how 
they affect the behavior models of businesses and other investors (ECIIA, 2012). This 
definition is close to one of the advanced definitions by economists Shleifer and 
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Vishny. In the United Kingdom, the scandals of several companies led to the 
establishment of the Cadbury Commission, which in 1992 formulated a voluntary code 
of corporate governance. 
 
A wider definition would be to describe corporate governance as a set of mechanisms 
through which businesses operate when ownership is separated from management. 
This definition is similar to the definition used by Sir Adrian Cadbury, Head of the 
Committee on Financial Aspects of UK Corporate Governance: "Corporate Governance 
is the system by which companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
Corporate governance is at the top of the business defining the relationships, the BoD, 
the senior executives, and the shareholders. The three above members are 
mechanisms that have power, can influence, regulate and control the decisions taken 
in the business, if they are at the top of it (Roe, 2004). The above definition of 
corporate governance shows motivation, monitoring and control (Staciokas and 
Rupsys, 2005). From the above, it is clear that corporate governance is the 
government's effort to ensure that the company seeks to protect the interests of its 
owners (Chang et al., 2006). 
Corporate governance is also defined as a system of principles on the basis of which an 
SA operates and is managed in order to preserve and satisfy the legitimate interests of 
all those related to the company in the context of the corporate interest (BSE, 2001). 
"Corporate Governance is the set of legal, institutional and customary arrangements, 
which must characterize activity primarily on listed companies but not just on those. 
Answering also, the questions of whom and how controlling the activities of the 
companies, as well as to whom the benefits are distributed, as well as the risks that 
arise from the corporate activity "(Traylos, 2004). 
 
 
3.2 Purpose of corporate governance  
 
The objective of corporate governance is therefore the efficiency and transparency of 
business operations and the protection of investors, small shareholders and creditors. 
However, it is an issue that has recently become ever larger in Greece and abroad, 
both in the private and public sector. The purpose of corporate governance is to 
strengthen the supervisory role of the board, to ensure adequate independence of the 
Board of Directors, decision-making, the adoption of transparency and valid 
information, as well as the protection of small shareholders. In the context of sound, 
corporate governance’s equal treatment of shareholders and their systematic updating 
foster their confidence in business and the capital market. 
 
Of course, the information published should be true and complete and, where 
necessary, audited by (independent) external and internal auditors. Moreover, this 
information should be prepared on the basis of internationally recognized principles 
and practices (such as financial statements). Corporate Governance aims to satisfy 
three basic principles, in terms of business activities and the Board of Directors: 
transparency, consistency and accountability. The role that corporate governance 
should play is balancing economic and social goals, as well as personal, individual and 
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wider business goals and interests. Therefore, there is a need for close cooperation 
between the company, shareholders and stakeholders (creditors, financial analysts, 
supervisors, etc.). It needs mutual trust and transparency (Doukas, 2002). 
 
In order to understand the corporate governance mission, it must be taken into 
account that it is a concept with "Anglo-Saxon payments". The Anglo-Saxon model is 
characterized by a large and well-developed stock market, in which listed companies 
have a particularly scattered shareholding. Therefore, corporate governance 
demand(s) that the dysfunctions that arose in the governance of these companies are 
resolved and attributed to the "passive shareholder" phenomenon, on the one hand, 
to the "passive or decorative" of the BoD, to the other (Athanasiou, 2003). 
 
Given the absence of relevant legislation, there has been a need for corporate 
governance principles. In particular, the Cadbury report, which contained non-binding 
guidelines on corporate governance and was based on comply or explain system, was 
published in 1992. In line with the US model of company organization approach, 
corporate governance principles should help create, maintain and maximize the value 
of shareholders' equity. 
 
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between internal corporate governance and 
external corporate governance. This is the disciplinary power of the market. 
 
 
 
3.3 Functioning of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance elements include the audit committee, the external auditor, 
internal control systems, and the Board of Directors. In addition, shareholders, 
professional organizations and stakeholders can also be included (Staciokas and 
Rupsys, 2005).  
 
Corporate governance is of interest to every SA or not. It is especially recommended to 
the listed companies on the Athens Stock Exchange. Corporate governance seeks 
complete transparency in the company's overall management so that all vital 
information is provided to all stakeholders in order to enable them to play an active 
role in the company's activity based on legislation, to protect and promote their 
interests fairly within the long-term and balanced development of the company. The 
principles and procedures of corporate governance are disseminated throughout the 
structure and operation of the company and concern the management bodies of the 
company (the Board of Directors and the general meeting) and the manner in which 
they are operated as well as the general relations of communication between various 
stakeholders. 
 
Management regulates the available funds, decides and executes, while the 
shareholders / investors of an enterprise provide the necessary funds. However, the 
following question arises: How can shareholders be assured that the administration 
seeks to maximize the market value of the business rather than its own personal 
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goals? This question is based on the existing bibliography as well as incidents from 
everyday life, which have actually been recorded in cases where the management's 
objectives did not fully harmonize with those of the owners / shareholders. In these 
cases, there is a conflict of interest between the management and the shareholders, as 
the management holds a smaller percentage of 100% of the company's capital. 
 
 
However, the following question emerges: how can shareholders be assured that the 
administration seeks to maximize the market value of the business rather than its own 
personal goals? There is a conflict of interest between the management and the 
shareholders if the management owns less of the company's capital. The likelihood of 
a conflict interest is further increasing in large stock listed companies where there is 
large stock dispersal. The dispersion of shares results in the existence of many 
shareholders who cannot agree with each other in order to perform effective control 
over the management. The only case in which management acts 100% in the interest 
of shareholders is when it is a family business. Based on the aforementioned, 
corporate governance is defined as the relationships and the division between 
shareholders, management and stakeholders of an enterprise. 
 
 
3.4 Fraud: Poor corporate governance and lack of internal control 
 
There has been a renewed interest in corporate governance practices since 2001, 
mainly due to the high profile collapse of a number of large companies, most of which 
involved accounting frauds. A common trend that ran through these monumental 
failures was poor corporate governance. Cases such as the famous Enron, Baring Bank, 
Parmalat, HIH, One, and the economic crisis in the countries of Southeast Asia as well 
as a number of other incidents testify that the importance of using governance in the 
private and public sector is considered to be necessary. The existence of bad corporate 
governance confirms maladministration, fraud, misuse of confidential information by 
management and members of the Board of Directors as well as the poor regulation of 
the company (Babalola, 2010). 
 
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance in controlling management 
incentives depends on non-trivial rules of external governance, such as legal provisions 
that limit the export of the private benefits of control, and those that enhance the 
reliability of the information reported by managers. According to the forecasts, 
revaluation gains, the incidence of accounting fraud and the gains of manipulation are 
less frequent in firms of audit committees, including an independent manager with 
financial knowledge (Klein, 2002). Οn the contrary, the manager's incentive to declare 
falsely that it comes from a building empire and equity benefits is based and mitigated 
by managerial fraud. 
 
This is because, based on equity and fees, they are adjusted to the final value of the 
stocks and not to the short-term share price where managers can handle and focus on 
how the investor tracking activity varies according to the duration of the business cycle 
(Goldman and Slezak, 2006).  
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3.5 The evolution of corporate governance legislation in Greece 
 
In Greece Law 2190/1920 introduces for the first time the basic corporate governance 
rules. However, until the early 1990s, both in Greece and internationally, there were 
no regulations that would effectively bind companies to how to exercise this 
administration and control and at the same time be linked to their viability over time. 
 
 
In 1999, the Capital Market Commission, aiming at the development of best corporate 
governance practices in the Greek market, in addition to the requirements of the 
legislation, adopted the "Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece - Guidelines for 
its Competitive Transformation" , modeled on the OECD Principles. A similar initiative 
was undertaken by SEV a few years later, in 2001, when it drew up general principles 
of corporate governance. In response to market requirements, the State has 
developed a corporate governance framework through the adoption of mandatory 
rules such as Law 3016/2002, Law 3693/2008, Law 3884/2010, and Law 3873/2010, 
which incorporated into the Greek legal Directive 2006/46 / EC of the European Union. 
 
 
Law 3873/2010 was the "foundation stone" of the CODE1developed by SEV, which 
applies the "compliance or explanation" approach and establishes standards of best 
governance practices for Greek companies. The CODE of SEV was developed to meet 
the need for a widely accepted and applied code that Greek companies could adopt or 
use as a model. 
 
In 2012, HELEX and SEV, as a demonstration of their commitment to promoting good 
corporate governance principles, set up the Greek Corporate Governance Council, 
which undertook to study and implement actions, to draft proposals and to organize 
consultations on the promotion of the principles of corporate governance, by any 
appropriate means (SEV, 2012). 
 
The CODE of SEV has been able to contribute to the improvement of the corporate 
governance practices adopted by the BoDs of Greek companies and therefore whether 
they are ready to adopt best corporate governance practices and / or to follow the 
directions that are expected to emerge both by the efforts of the European 
Commission, the ATE and the Capital Market Commission (OECD, 2004). 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Greek Code of Corporate Governance was written by SEV. Hellenic Code of Corporate 
Governance is called the "Code").  
The Code aims at the continuous improvement of the Greek corporate institutional framework and a 
broader business environment, as well as enhancing investor confidence for both listed companies as 
well as for each of them, and broadens the horizons of attracting investment chapters. 
 
 
-10- 
 
 
 
3.6 The Board of Directors 
 
The Role of the Board in a business is of high significance, as it oversees and controls 
the executives, but also adjusts the long-term strategy of the company. The increasing 
efficiency of the Board of Directors results from the adoption and implementation of a 
set of mechanisms and practices within the company. These mechanisms and practices 
concern the size of the Board, the frequency of its meetings, its evaluation procedures, 
the operation of special committees, the participation of non-executive and 
independent members in the BoD, the determination of their remuneration and the 
separate sessions, as well as the separation of the chairman from the position of CEO. 
 
The size of the Board should be such that there will not emerge problems of 
coordination between neither the members, nor any signs of lack of proposals and 
ideas. The size of the Board should be analyzed in detail by the companies so that they 
meet their needs and aspirations over time. 
 
Another important issue is the frequency of meetings of the Board of Directors. The 
number of meetings varies from company to company. It is a good corporate 
governance practice that the Board of Directors consists of a majority of non-executive 
directors and has a significant number of independent members. 
 
This practice is considered fundamental for the effective operation of the Board of 
Directors. Independent members are considered more capable of following the 
decisions of the Board (Bebchuck and Spamann, 2010). 
 
The participation of non-executive and independent members in the Board of 
Directors is recommended by virtually all corporate governance codes. The OECD Code 
states that Board of Directors should consider the possibility of selecting a sufficient 
number of non-executive members capable of performing their duties independently 
when conflicts of interest arise (OECD, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, according to the Law on Corporate Governance (L.3016 / 2002) non-
executive members of the Board of Directors of listed companies should not be less 
than 1/3 of the total number of the members. Among the non-executive members the 
law provides for at least two independent members. The presence of independent 
members is not obligatory when the Board of Directors is explicitly appointed and a 
minority of shareholders participates as members. 
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3.7 Audit Committee 
 
The Audit Committee is set up to support the Board of Directors. Its duties are on 
financial reporting, internal control and supervision of regular audit. The audit 
committee should be composed exclusively of non-executive members, most of them 
independently. The Audit Committee is at least three members and at least one (1) 
independent member has proven adequate knowledge of accounting and auditing. The 
committee should be promoted by an independent non-executive member. 
 
The corporate governance statement should describe the work of the committee in 
the performance of its tasks and the number of its meetings during the year. 
Moreover, the Audit Committee may use the services of external consultants and 
should therefore be allocated sufficient funds for this purpose (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
3.8 Separation of Chairman from the position of Managing Director 
 
Another important issue related to the Board is the separation of the Chairman's 
position from that of the CEO. The role of the president is to control the operation of 
the Board of Directors and to monitor the executive directors.  When the Managing 
Director also holds the position of Chairman, he or she has the power to control all the 
information available to the members of the Board, thereby reducing the possibility of 
effective supervision. Therefore, the effective separation of the executive decisions 
from the control decisions requires the Chairman of the Board to be a different person 
from the Managing Director (Kirkbride and Letza, 2002). 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
4.1. Sample and Questionnaire  
 
Several studies have shown that the role of internal control in governance should be 
given priority over other activities (Audrey et al., 2004). Internal control plays an 
important role in improving corporate governance in organizations and businesses. A 
company focuses particularly on the function of internal control and on the 
cornerstones of corporate governance so as to achieve quality in governance in 
general. It assesses the commitment to the ethics of the organization and its 
objectives, programs and activities (Okafor and Ibadin, 2009). The internal audit 
function is to control and maintain the quality of corporate governance (Prawitt, et al., 
2009). 
 
The target population for this study was internal auditors from Greek listed companies 
who are responsible for internal audits. The collection of primary data was 
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accomplished through the use of a questionnaire. Structured questionnaire was used 
because of its ability to collect high quality data within shortest possible time 
(Gbadago, 2015). Descriptive and inferential analyses are used in this study in order to 
determine the critical factors for the effectiveness of corporate governance in Greek 
organizations, while multiple regressions were used to test the hypotheses.  
 
4.2 Correlation of corporate governance and internal control 
 
It is now generally accepted that the correlation between internal control and 
corporate governance affects all types of economic activity and that the effects and 
consequences of this interaction have changed significantly in recent years. Internal 
control and corporate governance have become an issue of major public interest. The 
contribution of internal control to corporate governance is illustrated by delineating 
the relationship between internal control and the core elements of corporate 
governance. In the current business environment, internal auditors provide much 
wider management information on the organization of economic functions and 
compliance activities to improve the efficiency and performance of management and 
activities (Rezaee, 1996). 
 
Internal control continually develops new approaches, devises new products and 
control services, and contributes to the realization of increasingly complex 
requirements. In this regard, internal control may be expected to increasingly be 
oriented towards management consulting through effective corporate governance. 
Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Karagiorgos et al., 2010). 
 
In many surveys, the relationship between corporate governance and internal control 
has been captured. And it has been argued that if there is successful internal control 
then it also has a positive impact on the business performance of the enterprise (Holm 
and Laursen, 2007). Corporate governance is the process by which organizations 
manage and control (Gao et al., 2008). Furthermore, the non-executive directors 
should be independent, by underlining the important role that non-executive directors 
play in contributing to strengthen corporate governance. It has been widely recognized 
that the role of the internal auditor is becoming more important in terms of creating 
good corporate governance (Allegrini et al., 2006). It is documented that internal 
auditors can also help organizations respond to corporate governance expectations 
(Crawford and Stein, 2002). 
 
 
H1: The Internal Audit is positively associated with effective Corporate Governance 
 
H2: The Internal Auditor is positively associated with effective Corporate Governance 
 
H3: The Audit Committee is positively associated with effective Corporate Governance 
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According to the Institute Internal Auditors (2002), the long-term strategic goals and 
plans are interwoven with the effectiveness of corporate governance. Additionally, the 
structure of operation ensures “integrity, reputation and accountability”. Corporate 
governance and internal control are deeply connected, while audit committees could 
guarantee the necessary confidence in corporate governance for the directors and 
independence for internal auditors.   
 
 
 
4.3 Corporate Governance Risks 
 
Over the last few years, the need for risk management has been recognized as an 
essential part of good corporate governance. This fact has put organizations under 
increasing pressure to identify every business risk they encounter. 
 
Potential danger for a business is portrayed in the chances of failing to achieve all kinds 
of goals - opportunities placed by management or the likelihood of threats being 
reached. In fact, activities involved in risk management have been recognized as 
playing a central and essential role in maintaining a sound internal control system. 
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) is the general term covering an 
organization's approach to these three areas: Governance, Risk Management and 
Compliance (Silveira et al., 2011). It also reflects a new way in which organizations 
have embraced an integrated approach to these aspects of their business. 
Business organizations in their activities face a series of risks on a daily basis. These 
risks may be strategic, financial, operational, accidents, etc. Information on raising and 
analyzing risks is drawn from reports, internal and external auditors, consultant 
reports and business plans. Business risks, for better valuation and management 
analysis, can be intensified in various categories, such as: high, medium, low. 
 
 
 
4.4 Internal control necessity  
 
The information provided from the reporting, allows management to control and 
direct the business. It also keeps the administration informed whether the policy, 
determined by the company is implemented, if government regulation is taken into 
account, if the financial position is sound, if the functions are efficient and the 
relationships between the different parts are harmonious. 
 
The internal audit confirms that the financial statements prepared and the accounting 
records are accurate, reliable and present the real image of the company. The Internal 
Audit Institution defines internal control as a system that "helps an organization to 
achieve its objectives by providing a systematic and disciplined approach to assessing 
and improving the effectiveness of risk management, control and corporate 
governance processes "(ECIIA, 2012) 
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Moreover, it is a system of functions and procedures with proper organization and 
correct operating rules applied by the management of an economic unit in order to 
safeguard the interests of the organization (Chi and Chen, 1997). 
 
The internal control system is the company's plan and all the methods and procedures 
followed by the management in order to ensure a more efficient co-operation with the 
management of the company, the safeguarding of capital, the prevention and 
detection of fraud and the errors, accuracy and completeness of accounting records, 
and the timely preparation of all useful financial information (Meigs et al., 1984). 
 
Furthermore, "an enterprise's internal control system resembles the human nervous 
system that is branched throughout the enterprise by transferring commands and 
responses to and from the management" (Cook and Wincle, 1976). The 
aforementioned phrase is directly related to the organizational structure and general 
business rules of the company (Cai, 1997). 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Every research has as its ultimate purpose the investigation of some situations and it needs to 
be placed in a specific methodological framework, which will set the frameworks and limits of 
its development and will ensure the validity of its results. 
 
The fifth chapter presents the methodological approach from the study and the way the 
research is carried out. The survey was conducted to determine whether there was a lack of 
maturity of internal control and corporate governance structures and to depict that listed 
companies have on average affected internal control systems. 
 
It was decided it would be appropriate to create a questionnaire to be able to group the 
responses from the data we extracted from the company's annual financial statements for the 
export of results through a statistical program. 
 
For the empirical tests, we have used data obtain from for yearly financial information reports 
of 209 listed companies of ATHEX from 2012 to 2016, available on Amadeus database and 
Thomson Reuters, along with each company’s official website where much information can be 
found regarding corporate governance legislation, board of directors, audit committee and 
internal control. 
 
5.1 Model 
 
Taking into consideration the above literature review, four variables are selected to be 
examined in the present research. The first is “Corporate Governance” which is the 
dependent variable, and three independent variables which are “Internal Audit”, “Internal 
Auditor” and “Audit Committee”. 
 
 
CG = a + b1 ConIA + b2 IAQ + b3 AC + e i (1) 
The variables are defined below: 
 
CG = Corporate Governance 
 
ConIA = Consulting role of Internal Audit 
 
IAQ = Internal Audit Quality 
 
AC = Audit Committee 
 
a =constant 
 
e= error term  
 
CG = BODIND+ BODMET+ BODMEM- CEODUAL (2) 
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5.2 General Information 
 
                                                       
Definitions of Variables 
 
 
Variables                       Definitions 
 
ACMEET= how many times the audit committee meet 
EXPACC= what is the expertise of internal auditors (accounting, reporting and auditing) 
 
EXPFIN= what is the expertise of internal auditors (financial) 
 
EXPEC= what is the expertise of internal auditors (economics and accounting) 
 
EXPLAW= what is the expertise of internal auditors (law and economics) 
 
EXPPOL= what is the expertise of internal auditors (political sciences) 
 
ACMEMB= how many are the members of the audit committee 
 
PREMANAG= the President of the company and the Managing Director are 
the same person 
 
BODMET= board of directors meetings 
 
BODMEM= board of directors members 
 
BODIND= board of directors independence 
 
CEODUAL= CEO duality. The CEO and Chairman of each company should be 
a different person 
 
INDMEMB= are there any independent members in the audit committee 
 
ASSIZE= asset size dummy 
 
ROA= the net income before extraordinary items divided by the total assets 
 
TALN= total assets (Ln) 
 
GOV= corporate governance 
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5.3 Corporate Governance Index: Elements and Summary Statistics 
 
Description, including source and applicable legal requirement, if any, and summary statistics 
included within our overall Corporate Governance Index. 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Board Governance 
 
Identify several observable structural indicators of board strength such as boards’ size, the 
number of independent directors, the expertise of directors and the board’s diversity.  A 
board’s governance strength is assessed either by individual structural variables used 
separately or aggregates of the structural variables to distinguish between strong and weak 
corporate governance (Larker et. al 2007).    
 
Our first index aggregates the following indicators for board effectiveness: board 
independence, board members and board diligence (measured as the number of meetings 
held).   
A.     Board of Directors
Variable                                                                              Responses
A1. Board of directors meetings                                        144
A2. Board of directors’ members                                        144
A3. Board of directors’ independence                            144
A4.Firm holds four or more regular board meetings 
per year  
144
A5.Corporate governance legislation for every listed 
company   
124
                                                         
B.      Audit Committee and Internal Auditor
Variable                                                                              Responses
B1. Audit committee meetings                                            145
B2.Audit committee includes someone with expertise 
in accounting  
70
B3.Audit committee members attended at least 75% of 
meetings, on average 
145
B4.Audit committee meets two or more times per year     93
B5.Audit committee consisting of at 2/3 outside 
directors  
114
B6.Independence in the audit committee members 108
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Internal control and Audit Program Effectiveness 
 
Internal control is defined as a process, affected by the actions of board of directors and other 
organizational structure levels in the firm, designed to provide reasonable assurance toward 
achieving firm’s objectives, plans and strategies under related rules, polices and regulations 
(Domnisoru & Vinatoru, 2008; Li & Wei, 2008). 
 
 
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
 
In this section, we describe a number of checks on the robustness of our results and the 
reliability of our asset size dummy as an instrument of corporate governance. In order to 
provide robust coefficients and standard errors, our cross-section data models have been 
estimated with the OLS regression, so even in the case of heteroscedasticity or 
contemporaneous correlations in the errors term of the models, our results will be robust. 
Also, all continuous variables are winsorized in the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate any 
effects from outliers. 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
TABLE 1 
Notes: the TABLE 1 includes the descriptive statistics of the sample which consists of 128 companies for the 
period 2012-2016. The control variables are Return on Asset, the firm size (total assets) and its natural logarithm, 
the audit committee meetings, the expertise of the auditors, the audit committee members and the 
independence of its members 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
     INDMEMB           0         0         0     .4875         1         1  .5001912
      ACMEMB           0         3         3  2.388889         3         4  1.225092
      EXPACC           0         0         0  .4958333         1         1  .5003302
      ACMEET           0         0         0     .4875         1         1  .5001912
        LnTA    4.839214  15.92771  17.56762  16.93869  18.93894  21.21595  2.910637
         ROA      -.8847    -.0554    -.0062 -.0161786      .029      1.66  .1235312
         GOV    .3517895  .7316685  .9242714   1.07858   1.21194  23.37714  1.253769
                                                                                    
    variable         min       p25       p50      mean       p75       max        sd
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Pearson correlation matrix 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Notes: The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than or equal to 1. Correlations equal to 1 
or −1 correspond to data points lying exactly on the line whether the value of 0 in the Pearson correlation 
coefficient indicates no relationship between the two variables. . As the sign of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is positive, you can conclude that there is a positive correlation. The level of statistical significance 
(i.e., the p-value), and if the test is statistically significant, a star (*) next to the Pearson's correlation 
coefficient: This is shown in the second row. The sample size is shown in the third row 
 
 
 
 
Pearson correlation matrix is provided for dependent and independent variables in Table 2. 
On the Table, it is depicted that there is a positive correlation between “Corporate 
Governance” and “Audit Committee Meetings”, a significant and positive correlation between 
“Corporate Governance” and “Expertise of Audit Committee members with accounting 
knowledge” and a positive correlation between “Corporate Governance” and “Audit 
Committee Members”. 
 
  
GOV ROA LnTA ACMEET EXPACC ACMEMB INDMEMB
GOV 1.00
720
ROA 0.0097 1.00
0.8187
557 557
LnTA 0.0287 -0.1372* 1.00
0.5000 0.0012
553 551 553
ACMEET 0.0472 0.1137* 0.0294 1.00
0.2057 0.0073 0.4896
720 557 553 720
EXPACC 0.1091* 0.1262* 0.1920* 0.4444* 1.00
0.0034 0.0028 0.0000 0.0000
720 557 553 720 720
ACMEMB 0.0289 0.1385* 0.0974* 0.3234* 0.2817* 1.00
0.4392 0.0011 0.0220 0.0000 0.0000
720 557 553 720 720 720
INDMEMB 0.0359 0.1131* -0.0591 0.1606* 0.1387* 0.1101* 1.00
0.3355 0.0076 0.1651 0.0000 0.0002 0.0031
720 557 553 720 720 720 720
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TABLE 3 
Notes: ROA ratio for public companies can vary substantially and been highly dependent on the industry. Table 9 
reports the results of the regression using corporate governance as the dependent variable for firm- year 
observations from the years 2012-2016. The sample consists of 551 observations 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Asset size dummies and Corporate Governance  
 
 
In order to address any possible endogeneity, there has to be no influence by the dependent 
variable of interest (firm value, measured by Tobin’s q), but correlation with the independent 
variable of interest (corporate governance). To address endogeneity, we use an asset size 
dummy variable. Once we control for the direct effect of asset size on Tobin’s q through a 
control variable for ln(assets), it seems likely that the asset size dummy predicts firm value 
primarily indirectly, through its effect on corporate governance. 
 
Asset size dummy 1= 1 if ln(assets) >1.000.000 (assets) ; 0 otherwise 
Asset size dummy 2= 1 if ln(assets) >100.000.000 (assets) ; 0 otherwise 
Asset size dummy 3= 1 if ln(assets) >1.000.000.000 (assets) ; 0 otherwise 
  
Variables -1
ROA -0.079
(-0.19)
LnTA -0.003
(-0.18)
ACMEET 0.006
(0.04)
EXPACC 0.172
(1.22)
ACMEMB 0.008
(0.15)
INDMEMB -0.004
(-0.03)
(intercept) 0.882**
(2.00)
Year effects Included
R
2
0,037
Observations 551
Dependent variable = GOV), OLS analysis
Note : The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively 
(2-tailed).
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.  
TABLE 4 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Notes: to test the reliability we run selected regressions using the asset size dummy variables. There is a 
relationship between corporate governance and asset size due to general relationship between firm size and 
corporate governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     INDMEMB     0.0359   0.1131* -0.0591  -0.0015  -0.0332   0.1551*  0.1606*
      ACMEMB     0.0289   0.1385*  0.0974*  0.0314   0.1189*  0.0723   0.3234*
      EXPACC     0.1091*  0.1262*  0.1920*  0.1576*  0.2604*  0.1119*  0.4444*
      ACMEET     0.0472   0.1137*  0.0294   0.0046   0.0973*  0.1491*  1.0000 
     ASSIZE3     0.0080   0.0428   0.2059*  0.0575   0.2052*  1.0000 
     ASSIZE2     0.0571  -0.0352   0.6549*  0.2819*  1.0000 
     ASSIZE1     0.0487  -0.1479*  0.7826*  1.0000 
        LnTA     0.0287  -0.1372*  1.0000 
         ROA     0.0097   1.0000 
         GOV     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    GOV      ROA     LnTA  ASSIZE1  ASSIZE2  ASSIZE3   ACMEET
Variables (1) Variables (2) Variables (3)
ASSIZE1 0.064 ASSIZE1 0.356 ASSIZE1 0.003
(1.86) (0.92) (2.98)
ASSIZE2 0.087 ASSIZE2 0.030 ASSIZE2 0.219
(1.71) (2.17) (1.23)
ASSIZE3 0.608 ASSIZE3 0.000 ASSIZE3 0.000
(0.51) (10.45) (14.37)
LnTA 0.109 LnTA 0.138 LnTA 0.001
(-1.61) (-1.49) (-3.41)
ROA 0.768 ROA 0.003 ROA 0.002
(0.29) (2.97) (3.12)
Year effects Included Year effects Included Year effects Included
R
2 0.0089 R
2 0.0431 R2 0.0568
Observations 549 Observations 549 Observations 549
Dependent variable = GOV), OLS analysis, Robust Dependent variable = ACMEET), OLS analysis, 
Robust
Dependent variable = INDMEMB) 
OLS analysis, Robust
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6.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance  
 
 
TABLE 6 
Notes: Pearson Correlation. Calculating the Tobin’s q ratio 
 
 
We use Tobin’s Q as our proxy for firm valuation and ROA (return on assets) as measure. For Tobin’s 
Q, the representative specification is based on Mehran (1995), which applies the log of total assets as 
the measure of firm size2. Table 7 reports the results when we use Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable. We observe high 𝑅2 because market capitalization is in the nominator of Tobin’s Q. 
 
In most companies the Tobin's Q is between 0 and 0.95, which means that stocks are 
underestimated and companies in this situation would be willing to sell a part of their capital 
or leave the market. However, there are companies where the index is equal to 1, where the 
ideal situation is and shows us that the company is in equilibrium, while in companies whose 
index is greater than 1, 10 means that the company generates profit for its shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
2 Generally speaking, total assets measure total firm resources; market capitalization involves firm growth 
opportunities and equity market condition.  
     INDMEMB     0.0359   0.1131* -0.0591   0.0280   0.1606*  0.1387*  0.1101*
      ACMEMB     0.0289   0.1385*  0.0974* -0.3746*  0.3234*  0.2817*  1.0000 
      EXPACC     0.1091*  0.1262*  0.1920*  0.1604   0.4444*  1.0000 
      ACMEET     0.0472   0.1137*  0.0294  -0.1503   1.0000 
   TOBINSQ16     0.1726   0.5367* -0.0608   1.0000 
        LnTA     0.0287  -0.1372*  1.0000 
         ROA     0.0097   1.0000 
         GOV     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    GOV      ROA     LnTA TOBIN~16   ACMEET   EXPACC   ACMEMB
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TABLE 7 
Notes: regression with Tobin’s q. Ordinary least squares regressions of Tobins' Q with additional control variables 
added. We show that Tobin’s Q is positively related to Governance 
 
 
We also find that for Tobin’s Q, the sign of business risk (measured by the standard deviation 
of percentage change in operating income) is sensitive to different firm size measures.  ROA 
as the dependent variable (Table 9) also applies the log of total assets as the measure of firm 
size. 𝑅2 increases for OLS regression. 
 
Regarding the results of the present research, participants’ responses showed that all of the 
four variables of the model are evaluated positively. More specifically, the respondents 
evaluated positively the majority of the determinant factors used in order to assess the four 
variables. Our findings reveal that corporate governance is significantly and positively 
correlated to all three independent variables.  
 
Board structure is an important topic of corporate governance; the existing literature covers 
three prominent board characteristics: independence, meetings and members. We also use 
the market value of equity as the firm size measure. 
 
Firms with high market values choose better governance structures because they believe that 
there might be a further increase in firm value, or the high Tobin’s q measure will improve the 
governance structures. 
 
There is evidence of endogeneity in corporate governance studies. For example, Bhagat and 
Black (2002) report evidence from OLS regressions of negative correlation between board 
independence and measures of firm performance. Although, evidence was found claiming 
that firms with poor performance, increase the independence of their board directors.  
 
 
 
 
Variables (1)
GOV   0.267
(1.12)
ROA   0.000
(5.27)
LnTA    0.187
(-1.33)
_cons    0.187
(1.33)
R
2 0.3292
Observations 68
Dependent variable = Tobins'q), OLS analysis
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Furthermore, separation of position ensures that the chairman will exercise his / her 
responsibilities independently, serving the interests of the shareholders. In addition, 
segregation of position in an enterprise reduces the cost of the assignor-agent problem. More 
specifically, the issue of this problem consists in redefining the way of management and 
control of the company by redistributing the powers on the one hand between the 
shareholders and the management of the company and the members of the management 
among them in order to absorb the risks of the mandate, case provided by SA's financiers, 
namely the shareholders of the listed company in the administration for the good and 
efficient management of their funds ("principal-agent conflicts"). 
 
Studies have shown that the role of internal control in governance should take advantage 
over other activities. Internal control plays an important role in improving corporate 
governance in organizations and businesses. In order to achieve the quality of governance, 
the company should focus on all parameters of corporate governance, and in particular the 
functioning of internal control. In the place of the internal controller there must placed 
persons who are appropriately distinguished for their education, experience and morals; 
otherwise, as it is natural, they cannot perform the duties of the controller in the manner 
prescribed. 
 
Validity of financial reporting and the increasing quality of financial information can be 
accomplished through the internal audit function, which is considered as the most valuable 
tool. As was already mentioned, in order to develop strong corporate governance structure 
according to the agency theory, it is important to mitigate any possible conflicts of interest 
between management and company’s shareholders. The asymmetry of financial information 
between these two parties could be handled with the contribution of an effective and 
independent internal audit department which is going to provide both managers and 
shareholders with the necessary financial information in order to improve the level of 
confidence. 
 
 
As it is additionally stated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), by enhancing the role of internal 
audit in corporate governance matters and make it an important factor in developing a strong 
governance structure. 
 
Moreover, this positive association between corporate governance and audit committee is 
confirmed by previous research (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011, Knapp, 1987, Abbott et 
al., 2000, Regoliosi and d’Eri, 2012). On the other hand there are studies which have shown 
no straightforward association between these two variables (Cohen et al., 2002, Turley and 
Zaman, 2004). Regarding the relationship between internal audit quality and corporate 
governance, most of the previous academic research (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011, 
Krishnan, 2001, Suyono and Hariyando, 2012, Cohen et al., 2002) is in line with the results of 
our study as well. 
 
The last years big companies started including in their annual corporate reports, detailed 
management reports regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of internal control systems as 
an indicator to good corporate governance practice (Leng & Li, 2011; Saha & Arifuzzaman, 
2011).  
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The continuous collapses of large and small companies in recent decades, with the 
simultaneous disclosure of scandals that have led to this result have highlighted the 
importance of corporate governance. Corporate governance is of interest to any company 
limited or not. In all countries, laws have been in place for several decades defining the basic 
principles of corporate governance. Corporate governance is the system by which businesses 
are directed and controlled. 
 
The internal control system is the company's plan and all the methods and procedures 
followed by the management to ensure as efficiently as possible,  a more fruitful co-operation 
with the company's management, capital assurance, fraud prevention and detection, and 
error, accuracy and integration of accounting records, and the timely preparation of all useful 
financial information. 
 
The first part of the survey concerns all the listed companies of the AΤΗΕΧ. 
The sample was taken from 145 companies for years 2012-2016. We find that the auditing 
activities on the listed companies in the Athens Exchange need to be significantly improved. 
The internal audit services of listed companies should be strengthened in terms of mission, 
organization, human resources, methodology, audit reports and ways of publishing the results 
of their work so that they can add value and be able to cover the audit risks that characterize 
the firm or the organization. 
 
However, by analyzing more carefully the results of the research, it is quite remarkable 
whether the members of the audit committees have the necessary resources to fulfill their 
role. If they have the necessary information from the internal audit units on the methodology 
and content of the international standards for the professional implementation of internal 
control, but moreover whether the internal control units are able to rely on their compliance 
with international standards for the professional implementation of internal control. 
 
The purpose of corporate governance is to strengthen the supervisory role of the board, 
ensure adequate management board independence, transparency and valid information, as 
well as the protection of small shareholders. Several studies have shown that the role of 
internal control in governance should be prioritized over others, because internal control 
plays an important role in improving corporate governance in organizations and businesses. 
 
Internal audit plays a crucial role in ensuring the success and sustainability of any 
organization, providing reliable and unbiased services to the management, the Board of 
Directors and the audit committee (Ljubisavljevic and Jovanovic, 2011).  
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Appendix 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for a sample comprising of 128 companies, translated into 551 observations 
Variable Min 25th Median Mean 75th Max StDev 
 GOV 0,480 0,736 0,927 1,114 1,218 23,377 1,421 
 ROA -0,885 -0,055 -0,006 -0,015 0,030 1,660 0,124 
 LnTA 4,839 15,928 17,568 16,946 18,939 21,216 2,900 
 ACMEET 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,499 1,000 1,000 0,500 
 EXPACC 0,000 0,000 1,000 0,544 1,000 1,000 0,498 
 ACMEMB 0,000 3,000 3,000 2,407 3,000 4,000 1,220 
 INDMEMB 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,479 1,000 1,000 0,500 
 Note: All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
 TABLE 8 
We use Pearson correlation matrix it in order to measure the strength and direction of the association that exists 
between our variables. The Pearson correlation generates a coefficient which is referred as Pearson correlation 
coefficient and is commonly represented as r. A Pearson's correlation draws a line that tries to best fit the data 
of the variables. In this case the Pearson correlation coefficient. r. indicates how far away all data points are from 
the line of best fit. The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than or equal to 1. 
Correlations equal to 1 or −1 correspond to data points lying exactly on the line. A value of 0 in the Pearson 
correlation coefficient indicates no relationship between the two variables. 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 
  
Variables (1)
GOV 0.730
(-0.35)
LnTA 0.241
(1.18)
TOBIN'S Q 0.004
(2.95)
(intercept) 0.683
(-0.41)
Year effects Included
R
2 0.3074
Observations 68
Dependent variable = ROA), OLS analysis
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Statements Regarding Corporate Governance 
 
1. Indicate in what extent is the connection of top management and the board of Directors close 
2. Well managed companies develop financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles 
3. Corporate governance promotes compliance with legal requirements and rules 
 
Statements Regarding Internal Audit Quality 
 
4. Internal audit provides recommendation for improvements in areas where opportunities and 
deficiencies are identified 
5. Internal Auditors are sufficiently educated and qualified 
6. Internal Audit operation and actions comply with accounting and auditing standards 
7. Internal Auditors act in a high level of independence 
8. The size of internal audit department within the company is important 
9. The experience of the internal audit team affects the decisions on internal control system 
 
 
Statements Regarding Audit Committee 
 
10. Audit committee contributes to the communication between auditors and the board of 
directors 
11. The members of the audit committee acquire financial knowledge 
12. The audit committee’s meetings are often 
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